Garnishment – Michigan law

February 27, 2009 at 6:44 pm | In Debt Collection, Garnishment, Legal, Michigan law, Patents | Leave a Comment

Garnishment

NewAsk your questions about garnishment law here.

Michigan – Attachment and Garnishment

Act 236 of 1961
Chapter 40
Attachment and Garnishment

  • MCL §600.4001Attachment; ex parte application; service of writ; jurisdiction.
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  • MCL §600.4011 - Garnishment; property or obligation applicable to satisfaction of claim; jurisdiction; state and governmental units as garnishees; ex parte application for writ of garnishment; service; conditions to commencement of garnishment proceeding; immunity of sheriff or other public officer; fee; conveyance of money or property.
     

    • (1) Subject to sections 4061 and 4061a, and the conditions in subsections (2) to (10), the court has power by garnishment to apply the following property or obligation, or both, to the satisfaction of a claim evidenced by contract, judgment of this state, or foreign judgment, whether or not the state has jurisdiction over the person against whom the claim is asserted:
      • (a) Personal property belonging to the person against whom the claim is asserted but which is in the possession or control of a third person if the third person is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state and the personal property to be applied is within the boundaries of this state.
      • (b) An obligation owed to the person against whom the claim is asserted if the obligor is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state.
    • (2) Except as provided in sections 4061 and 4061a, the court may exercise the jurisdiction granted in this section only in accordance with the Michigan court rules. Except as otherwise provided by sections 4061 and 4061a and the Michigan court rules, the state and each governmental unit within the state, including but not limited to a public, municipal, quasi-municipal, or governmental corporation, unincorporated board, public body, or political subdivision, may be proceeded against as a garnishee in the same manner and with the same effect as a proceeding against an individual garnishee.
    • (3) A writ of garnishment may be issued before judgment only as provided in this subsection. Upon ex parte application showing that the person against whom the claim is asserted is not subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state or, after diligent effort, cannot be served with process as required to subject the person to the judicial jurisdiction of the state, a copy of the writ of garnishment shall be served upon the person against whom the claim is made in the same manner as provided by the Michigan court rules for service of process in other civil actions in which personal jurisdiction over the defendant is not required. Upon entry of judgment in the principal action, the obligation or property garnished shall be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment.
    • (4) A garnishment proceeding shall not be commenced against the state or a governmental unit of the state, including but not limited to a public, municipal, quasi-municipal, or governmental corporation, unincorporated board, public body, or political subdivision, until after the plaintiff’s claim has been reduced to judgment.
    • (5) A garnishment proceeding shall not be commenced against a person for money owing to a defendant on account of labor performed by the defendant until after the plaintiff’s claim has been reduced to judgment.
    • (6) A sheriff or other public officer is not subject to garnishment for money or things received or collected by him or her pursuant to an execution or other legal process in the favor of the defendant or because of any money in his or her hands for which he or she is accountable merely as a public officer to the defendant.
    • (7) A garnishment proceeding shall not be commenced if the commencement of such a proceeding is forbidden by a statute of this state.
    • (8) Except as otherwise provided in sections 4012 and 4061, a plaintiff shall pay a fee of $1.00 to the garnishee at the time the garnishee is served with a writ of garnishment.
    • (9) If the court or garnishee possesses money or property pursuant to a writ of garnishment after the court releases the garnishee from liability under that writ, the court shall convey or order the conveyance of the money or property to any of the following, as the court determines appropriate:
      • (a) The defendant’s attorney, if the defendant is represented by counsel in the garnishment proceeding.
      • (b) The defendant, if the defendant is not represented by counsel in the garnishment proceeding.
      • (c) The plaintiff.
    • (10) A writ of garnishment is not effective if both of the following conditions are met:
      • (a) The plaintiff fails to provide the garnishee with information sufficient for the garnishee to identify the defendant.
      • (b) The garnishee provides the court with written notice of the insufficiency described in subdivision (a).
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  • MCL §600.4012Writ of garnishment as to periodic payments; duration; priority of writs of garnishment; liability of garnishee defendant; fee; “periodic payments” defined.
     

    • (1) Except for garnishment of a tax refund under section 4061a, and subject to subsection (2), a writ of garnishment of periodic payments remains in effect for the period prescribed by the Michigan court rules.
    • (2) A garnishee is not liable for a writ of garnishment of periodic payments under subsection (1) to the extent that the garnishee is required to satisfy another writ of garnishment against the same defendant having a higher priority or having the same priority but received at an earlier date. For purposes of this subsection, writs of garnishment have priority in the following order:
      • (a) A garnishment resulting from an obligation of court ordered support as defined in section 2 of the support and parenting time enforcement act, Act No. 295 of the Public Acts of 1982, being section 552.602 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
      • (b) A levy of the state or a governmental unit of the state to satisfy a tax liability.
      • (c) Any other garnishments, in the order in which they are served.
    • (3) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a plaintiff shall pay a fee of $6.00 at the time a writ to the garnishee of garnishment of periodic payments is served upon the garnishee.
    • (4) As used in this section and section 8410a, “periodic payments” means wages, salary, commissions, and other earnings, land contract payments, rent, and other periodic debt or contract payments that are or become payable during the effective period of the writ of garnishment. Periodic payments do not mean any of the following:
      • (a) Payments by a financial institution of interest on a deposit account.
      • (b) Charges made by a financial institution automatically against an account which applies to a debt under an automatic payment authorization executed by the account owner.
      • (c) Payments made by a financial institution to honor a check or draft or to comply with an account holder’s order of withdrawal of funds from an account.
      • (d) Interest earned on a certificate of deposit that is paid into a deposit account.
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  • MCL §600.4015Actions as cause of discipline or discharge of principal defendant from employment; reinstatement; civil action.

    A garnishee defendant shall not use the fact that the principal defendant has had 1 or more actions brought against him under the provisions of this chapter or section 8306 as a cause of discipline or discharge of the principal defendant from employment. A garnishee defendant who violates the provisions of this section shall be required to reinstate the principal defendant to employment and reimburse all compensation lost by the discipline or discharge. The principal defendant may enforce his rights under this section by appropriate civil action.

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  • MCL §600.4021 – Attachment; venue.
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  • MCL §600.4025Venue; garnishment.

    The county which would be a proper county of venue as designated in RJA chapter 16 of an action against the defendant who is garnisheed is a proper county of venue for garnishment if —

    • (1) the county is designated in RJA chapter 16 as a proper county of venue of the action against the principal defendant; or
    • (2) there is no common proper county of venue designated in RJA chapter 16 of an action against the principal and garnishee defendant; or
    • (3) personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the principal defendant.
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  • MCL §600.4031 - Exemptions; attachment and garnishment; partial exemptions.
     

    • (1) The provisions of the statutes relating to exemptions from execution, and the manner of levying upon property belonging to a class or species in which exemptions are by law allowed, shall be applicable to the application of property and obligations to claims by attachment and garnishment.
    • (2) In any garnishment proceeding where the indebtedness of the garnishee to the principal defendant is money owed to the principal defendant on account of
      • (a) the sale to the garnishee of milk or cream or both produced on the farm or farms of the principal defendant, the garnishee’s liability to the plaintiff is limited to 40% of such money;
      • (b) personal labor performed by the principal defendant or his family, the garnishee’s liability to the plaintiff is limited by the exemptions allowed under section 7511.
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  • MCL §600.4035 – Attachment; effect; personalty; realty.
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  • MCL §600.4041 – Attachment on realty; discharge.
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  • MCL §600.4045Attachment or garnishment; dissolution by bond.

    In every case where property is attached or garnishment is served, the attachment or garnishment may be dissolved by the posting of a bond in accordance with the rules of the supreme court.

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  • MCL §600.4051False answer by garnishee or agent; civil liability.

    Any person summoned as a garnishee or any officer, agent, or other person who appears and answers for a corporation summoned as a garnishee, who knowingly and wilfully answers falsely upon his disclosure or examination on oath is liable to the plaintiff in garnishment, or to his executors or administrators, to pay out of his own goods and estate the full amount due on the judgment recovered with interest, to be recovered in a civil action.

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  • MCL §600.4061Garnishment against state; employees designated to receive process; procedures.
     

    • (1) A plaintiff shall serve garnishment process issued from a court in Michigan against the state of Michigan upon the state treasurer or other state employee designated by the state treasurer to receive garnishment process. The state treasurer shall designate as many employees as he or she considers necessary to receive garnishment process, at least 2 of whom shall have offices in Lansing.
    • (2) The state treasurer shall designate the employees under subsection (1) in writing and maintain a copy of the written designation in the state treasurer’s office. If the state treasurer revokes the designation, the revocation shall be made in the same manner as the designation. If a designated employee ceases to be employed by the state treasurer to receive process under subsection (1), the designation of that person is revoked immediately upon termination of his or her employment.
    • (3) In a garnishment proceeding in which the state is the garnishee, a plaintiff shall do all of the following:
      • (a) Serve upon the state treasurer or designated employee a writ of garnishment that includes a verified statement signed by the plaintiff, or his or her attorney or agent, identifying the full amount including interest and taxed costs, claimed by the plaintiff to be due upon the judgment against the defendant.
      • (b) At the time of service of the writ of garnishment, pay to the state treasurer or designated employee a fee of $6.00.
      • (c) Within 7 days after service of the writ of garnishment on the state treasurer or designated employee, do both of the following:
        • (i) If the writ of garnishment is for a state tax refund or credit, serve a copy of the writ of garnishment upon the defendant in the manner prescribed by the Michigan court rules.
        • (ii) Serve upon the state treasurer any discovery request for information related to the garnishment proceeding that may be in the possession of the department of treasury.
    • (4) After receiving a discovery request pursuant to subsection (3)(c), the state treasurer shall provide only that information in the possession of the department of treasury that is not otherwise exempted by law from disclosure. The plaintiff shall pay to the state treasurer the reasonable costs incurred by the state treasurer in providing the requested information.
    • (5) After receiving service of a writ of garnishment as provided in subsection (3), the state treasurer or designated employee shall do 1 of the following:
      • (a) If the writ is not for the garnishment of a state tax refund or credit, respond in the manner prescribed for garnishment procedures under the Michigan court rules.
      • (b) If the writ is for garnishment of a state tax refund, respond in the manner prescribed by section 4061a.

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  • MCL §600.4061aInterception of state tax refund or credit.
     

    • (1) The state treasurer shall intercept a state tax refund or credit that is subject to a writ of garnishment served upon the state treasurer pursuant to section 4061. Upon intercepting a state tax refund or credit pursuant to a writ of garnishment, the state treasurer shall do all of the following:
      • (a) Calculate the amount available from the interception to satisfy all or part of the garnishment, and within 90 days after establishing other liability for which the state tax refund or credit may be applied under section 30a of Act No. 122 of the Public Acts of 1941, being section 205.30a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, do both of the following:
        • (i) File with the court a verified disclosure that identifies the intercepted amount, less any setoff, counterclaim, or other demand of the state against the defendant.
        • (ii) Serve upon the plaintiff and defendant a copy of the disclosure described in subparagraph (i).
      • (b) Unless notified by the court that objections to the writ of garnishment have been filed, deposit the amount available for the garnishment with either of the following pursuant to the terms of the writ not less than 28 days after filing the disclosure pursuant to subdivision (a):
        • (i) The clerk of the court.
        • (ii) The plaintiff’s attorney of record in the garnishment action, or, if the plaintiff is not represented by counsel, the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s designee.
    • (2) Objections to the writ of garnishment of a tax refund shall be filed with the court within 14 days after the date of service of the disclosure on the defendant.
    • (3) If an interception of a state tax refund or credit does not occur before October 31 of the year during which a writ of garnishment for a state tax refund or credit is to be processed, both of the following apply:
      • (a) The state treasurer is not required to provide to the defendant or file with the court a disclosure.
      • (b) The state treasurer is not required to provide to the plaintiff a disclosure unless the plaintiff provides the state treasurer with a written request for a disclosure between November 1 and December 31 of the tax year following the tax year for which a writ of garnishment of a state tax refund or credit was filed.
    • (4) A disclosure described in subsection (1) is not required to be made under oath.
    • (5) The state’s liability to the plaintiff under a writ of garnishment issued under this section is limited to the amount of the tax refund or credit due to the defendant for the period the writ is in effect, less any setoff, counterclaim, or other demand of the state against the defendant. As used in this subsection, “state” includes the state treasurer.
    • (6) If all or a portion of an intercepted state tax refund or credit is deposited with the clerk of the court under subsection (1), the court shall convey the deposited amount to the plaintiff’s attorney of record in the garnishment action or, if the plaintiff is not represented by counsel, to the plaintiff.
    • (7) Michigan court rules that do not conflict with this section or section 4061 govern a garnishment in which the state is a garnishee.
    • (8) As used in this section, “state treasurer” includes an employee designated by the state treasurer to act on his or her behalf.
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  • MCL §600.4065

    Evidence in criminal proceedings; disclosure.No disclosure made under the provisions of the garnishment statutes or rules shall be used in evidence upon a criminal prosecution except upon a prosecution of the garnishee for perjury in making his disclosure.

Washington Mutual (WaMu) credit cards

February 24, 2009 at 11:28 pm | In Credit card debt | Leave a Comment

Washington Mutual credit cards -or-
WaMu credit cards

See: Hypothetical example of active duty military member with WaMu credit card recovering excessive interest charges.

Washington Mutual Card Services
P.O. Box 660487
Dallas, Texas 75266-0487
800-280-9441
800-280-9441

Washington Mutual Card Services
3801 S Collins St
Arlington, TX 76014
817-276-5900‎

WaMu Branch banks in Texas

Chase to Take Washington Mutual’s Card Business In House

Columbus, Ga., December 2, 2008 — TSYS announced today that it has entered into an agreement with JPMorgan Chase (Chase) with respect to the discontinuation of the servicing of Washington Mutual Bank’s (WaMu’s) consumer card portfolio by TSYS. In addition, the parties agreed to an extension of the processing agreement between TSYS and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Toronto Branch) for its Canadian card business through April 30, 2012. Chase will pay TSYS fees for deconversion and termination which both parties have agreed not to disclose. The deconversion is expected to take place in March 2009 after which Chase will process the WaMu portfolio in house on the technology platform it licenses from TSYS.

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Washington Mutual, Inc.
Washington Mutual, Inc.
1201 3rd Ave
Seattle WA 98101
(Holding company)

Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV
2273 North Green Valley Parkway
Henderson, Nevada, 89014
www.wamu.com
Immediate parent – Washington Mutual, Inc.
Source: iBanknet

Washington Mutual Bank, FSB
6250 Sagewood Drive,
Park City, UT 84098
435-655-4929
435-655-4920 Fax
www.wamu.com
Immediate parent – Washington Mutual, Inc.

Regulated by Federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)

F.D.I.C. – Bank Acquisition Information – for Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT

F.D.I.C. – Continuation of Contracts Transferred From Washington Mutual Bank

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J. P. Morgan Chase & F.D.I.C. purchase and assumption agreement of  Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV

F.D.I. C. press release September 25, 2008

Office of Thrift Supervision – Fact Sheet on Washington Mutual Bank

NYT: Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets
By ERIC DASH and ANDREW ROSS SORKIN
Published: September 25, 2008

Washington Mutual, the giant lender that came to symbolize the excesses of the mortgage boom, was seized by federal regulators on Thursday night, in what is by far the largest bank failure in American history. Regulators simultaneously brokered an emergency sale of virtually all of Washington Mutual, the nation’s largest savings and loan, to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion, averting another potentially huge taxpayer bill for the rescue of a failing institution. . .

. . . By taking on all of WaMu’s troubled mortgages and credit card loans, JPMorgan Chase will absorb at least $31 billion in losses that would normally have fallen to the F.D.I.C.

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WaMu’s credit card operation acquired from Providian National Bank on October 1, 2005

Brief history of Washington Mutual

An even briefer history of Washington Mutual

Kentucky exemption statutes

February 21, 2009 at 7:11 pm | In Bankruptcy, Debt Collection, Kentucky law, Legal | Leave a Comment

Kentucky exemption law

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
Title 39 – Provisional Remedies, Enforcement
Chapter 427 – Exemptions

Contents:

  • KRS §427.005 Definitions.
  • KRS §427.010 Exempt personal property and disposable earnings of individual debtors.
  • KRS §427.020 Appraisement of defendant’s property — Selection by defendant.
  • KRS §427.030 Debtor’s tools exempt.
  • KRS §427.040 Professional libraries and vehicle exempt.
  • KRS §427.045 Exemptions not applicable to claims for child support.
  • KRS §427.050 Out-of-state law applicable when wages earned and payable out-of-state — Exceptions.
  • KRS §427.060 Homestead and burial plot exemptions — Exceptions.
  • KRS §427.070 Right of spouse and children to homestead.
  • KRS §427.080 Valuation and allotment of homestead exemption.
  • KRS §427.090 Payment of money in lieu of homestead exemption.
  • KRS §427.100 Waiver of homestead exemption — Continuance after death
  • KRS §427.110 Insurance benefits — Exemptions.
  • KRS §427.120 Police and firefighters’ pension fund in cities of the first, second, and third classes — Exempt from process in some cases.
  • KRS §427.125 Police and firefighters’ pension fund in cities of fourth class — Exempt from process in some cases.
  • KRS §427.126 Repealed, 1966.
  • KRS §427.130 Salaries of public officials and employees and sums due from governmental agencies are subject to attachment or garnishment — Service of process.
  • KRS §427.140 Employee may not be discharged for garnishment for one (1) indebtedness.
  • KRS §427.150 Property totally or partially exempt.
  • KRS §427.160 Additional general exemption.
  • KRS §427.170 Federal bankruptcy code exemptions applicable in Kentucky.
  • KRS §427.180 Grain storage receipt or scale ticket as prima facie claim of right to possession.
  • KRS §427.990 Penalty.

Bankruptcy exemptions

February 21, 2009 at 6:56 pm | In Bankruptcy, Debt Collection, Legal | 2 Comments

11 U.S.C. sec. 522(d) provides the following exemptions:

(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:

  • (1) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $15,000 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
  • (2) The debtor’s interest, not to exceed $2,400 in value, in one motor vehicle.
  • (3) The debtor’s interest, not to exceed $400 in value in any particular item or $8,000 in aggregate value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
  • (4) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,000 in value, in jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
  • (5) The debtor’s aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed in value $800 plus up to $7,500 of any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
  • (6) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.
  • (7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor,other than a credit life insurance contract.
  • (8) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed in value$8,000 less any amount of property of the estate transferred in the manner specified in section 542(d) of this title, in any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent.
  • (9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
  • (10) The debtor’s right to receive -
    • (A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assistance benefit;
    • (B) a veterans’ benefit;
    • (C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
    • (D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
    • (E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing,annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness,disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless -
      • (i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor’s rights under such plan or contract arose;
      • (ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
      • (iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section401(a), 403(a), 403(b), or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
  • (11) The debtor’s right to receive, or property that is traceable to -
    • (A) an award under a crime victim’s reparation law;
    • (B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
    • (C) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the life of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent on the date of such individual’s death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
    • (D) a payment, not to exceed $15,000, on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent; or
    • (E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
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“An estate in bankruptcy consists of all the interests in property, legal and equitable, possessed by the debtor at the time of filing, as well as those interests recovered or recoverable through transfer and lien avoidance provisions. An exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor. Section 522 determines what property a debtor may exempt. Under 522(b), he must select between a list of federal exemptions (set forth in 522(d)) and the exemptions provided by his State, “unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize,” 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(1) — that is, unless the State “opts out” of the federal list. If a State opts out, then its debtors are limited to the exemptions provided by state law. Nothing in subsection (b) (or elsewhere in the Code) limits a State’s power to restrict the scope of its exemptions; indeed, it could theoretically accord no exemptions at all.”

MPM Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton – Ky. App. 2007

February 17, 2009 at 6:11 pm | In Garnishment, Kentucky, Legal | Leave a Comment

MPM Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton
No. 2005-CA-002539-MR
Kentucky Court of Appeals, May 18, 2007

MPM FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
Appellant
v.
MICHAEL P. MORTON
Appellee

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION No. 03-CI-00740.

Brief For Appellant:

Carroll M. Redford, III – Lexington, Kentucky

Brief For Appellee:
R. Bruce Stith, III – Lexington, Kentucky

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Paisley, Senior Judge

TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION – AFFIRMING

Before: Chief Judge Combs, Judge Wine, and Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley (sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.)

MPM Financial Group, Inc. (MPM) appeals from an opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court in which the trial court held that the federal bankruptcy exemptions incorporated into Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 427.170 apply to non-bankruptcy debtors in the Commonwealth, thus depriving MPM of a garnishable source of funds from one of the corporation’s judgment debtors. On appeal, MPM argues that the General Assembly has consistently used the words “debtor” and “estate” in KRS Chapter 427 to refer to bankruptcy; therefore, the use of those words in KRS 427.170 means the statute applies only to bankruptcy debtors. MPM also argues that the trial court’s interpretation of KRS 427.170 renders KRS 427.150 superfluous. Lastly, MPM argues that, based on the legislative history of KRS 427.170, the statute applies only to bankruptcy debtors. Agreeing with the trial court, we affirm.

On January 5, 2004, MPM obtained a judgment against Michael P. Morton in the amount of $14,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees. However, the corporation had difficulties collecting from Morton. In June of 2005, MPM learned that Morton had a disability insurance policy with UNUM Provident Insurance Company (UNUM) and that he was receiving $3,750.00 per month in benefits pursuant to that policy. On June 24th, MPM served an order of garnishment on UNUM seeking Morton’s disability payments. UNUM complied with the garnishment order and began forwarding Morton’s monthly benefit payments to MPM. On August 11, 2005, Morton filed an affidavit with the Fayette Circuit Court challenging MPM’s garnishment. In his affidavit, Morton argued that his disability payments were exempt from garnishment pursuant to KRS 427.150. Later, Morton filed a notice with the trial court claiming that his disability payments were exempt pursuant to KRS 427.170 and 11 USC § 522(d)(10)(C) even though Morton had not filed for bankruptcy.

On November 9, 2005, the trial court entered an opinion and order in which it held that Morton’s disability payments were not exempt from garnishment pursuant to KRS 427.150(2)(d). However, the trial court noted that, on June 20, 2005, the General Assembly had amended KRS 427.170 to incorporate the federal bankruptcy exemptions found in 11 USC § 522(d), which include an exemption for disability payments. Furthermore, the trial court held that the federal exemptions incorporated into KRS 427.170 were not limited to bankruptcy debtors but applied to all debtors in the Commonwealth. So, the trial court determined that Morton’s disability payments were exempt from garnishment pursuant to KRS 427.170.

On appeal, MPM insists that the trial court misapplied KRS 427.170. MPM points out that the federal exemptions incorporated into KRS 427.170 are virtually identical to the exemptions set forth in KRS 427.150, although the federal exemptions are more generous. MPM argues that if we were to adopt the trial court’s interpretation of KRS 427.170, then we would render KRS 427.150 superfluous, in essence repealing that statute. According to MPM, if the General Assembly had intended to repeal KRS 427.150 when it amended KRS 427.170, then it would have done so.

When we interpret a statute, we will attempt to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent from the language found in the statute if possible. KRS 446.080(1); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Ky. 2004); Moore v. Alsmiller, 289 Ky. 682, 160 S.W.2d 10, 12 (1942). Generally, a statute is open to construction only if its language is ambiguous. If the language is clear and the application of its plain meaning would not lead to an absurd result, then further interpretation is unnecessary. Overnite Transportation v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Ky.App. 1990). However, if a statute is ambiguous and its meaning uncertain, then the legislative intent should be determined by considering the whole statute and the purpose to be accomplished. Department of Motor Transportation v. City Bus Co., 252 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1952). Furthermore, our interpretation of the statute should neither add to nor subtract from it; should not produce an absurd result; and should produce a result that is both practical and reasonable. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, supra at 445; Walker v. Kentucky Dept. of Education, 981 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Ky.App. 1998).

KRS 427.170, as amended in 2005, reads, in its entirety, “An individual debtor domiciled in this state is authorized to exempt from property of said debtor’s estate the property specified under 11 U.S.C. sec. 522(d).” We can find no ambiguity in this statute. Applying the plain meaning of the statute’s language, we conclude that the federal exemptions apply to all individual debtors in the Commonwealth, including bankruptcy debtors and non-bankruptcy debtors. If the General Assembly had intended to limit the application of the federal exemptions to bankruptcy debtors, then it would have included language to that effect as it did in KRS 427.160. Appellant argues that this interpretation renders KRS 427.150 superfluous. We disagree. We point out that KRS 427.170 does not set forth the text of 11 USC § 522(d) but incorporates that statute’s exemptions by reference. The exemptions available pursuant to KRS 427.170 are contingent upon the language currently found in 11 USC § 522(d); however, the exemptions currently found in 11 USC § 522(d) are subject to change by the United States Congress. At any time, Congress can amend or repeal 11 USC § 522(d), thereby effectively amending or repealing KRS 427.170. Given this possibility, KRS 427.150 now provides debtors in the Commonwealth guaranteed exemptions independent of those federal exemptions incorporated into KRS 427.170. In other words, KRS 427.150 establishes a floor for exemptions, while KRS 427.170 provides a ceiling. KRS 427.170 does not repeal KRS 427.150; instead, the two statutes complement one another. We do not agree with MPM that this is an absurd result. It is both practical and reasonable.

In the alternative, MPM argues that, while the General Assembly used the word “individual” in KRS 427.150, in KRS 427.170 it used the words “individual debtor” and “estate”, words that, MPM claims, are used consistently in KRS Chapter 427 to refer to bankruptcy. We find this argument unconvincing. Those are words of plain and ordinary meaning. If the General Assembly had intended KRS 427.170 to apply only to those who had filed for bankruptcy, it could clearly have said so.

MPM also argues that the legislative history regarding KRS 427.170 supports the proposition that it applies strictly to bankruptcy debtors. In 1978, the United States Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which provided the federal exemptions set forth in 11 USC § 522(d). However, the Congress granted the individual states the right to “opt out” of the federal exemptions and adopt their own. As MPM points out, in 1980, the Commonwealth originally enacted KRS 427.170 to opt out of the federal exemptions. In addition, the General Assembly enacted KRS 427.150 to provide exemptions for bankruptcy debtors, as well as all other debtors, in the Commonwealth. MPM points out that in 2005, Congress amended 11 USC § 522 and “toughened up the federal exemptions.” According to MPM, in response to Congress’s action, the General Assembly amended KRS 427.170 to give bankruptcy debtors in the Commonwealth access to the exemptions found in 11 USC § 522(d). MPM insists that the General Assembly meant for these exemption to apply only to bankruptcy debtors because, when the General Assembly first enacted the prior KRS 427.170 in 1980, the statute applied only to bankruptcy debtors.

KRS 427.170’s legislative history does not place any constraints on the General Assembly’s power to amend the statute in any way that it sees fit. As we previously held, the language of KRS 427.170, as amended, is not ambiguous, and it applies to all debtors in the Commonwealth, the statute’s legislative history notwithstanding.

We note that, in Morton’s brief, he argues that the trial court erred when it held that KRS 427.150(2)(d) did not apply to his disability benefits. KRS 427.150(2)(d) contains an exemption for debtors who receive compensation for the loss of future earnings. Morton argues that his disability benefits constitute compensation for the loss of future earnings. While Morton’s argument is interesting, he failed to file a cross-appeal regarding this issue; therefore, we cannot address its merits since it is not before us.

The opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.

COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.

WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.

Contrary to the trial judge’s contention that the Kentucky legislature never intended for KRS 427.170 to be limited to bankruptcy proceedings, the very title of the statute, “Federal bankruptcy code exemptions applicable in Kentucky,” and its reference to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) can lead to no other conclusion. Further, KRS 427.150(2)(f) provides for an exemption of certain retirement accounts under both Kentucky law as well as the Federal Bankruptcy Code, thus, distinguishing exemptions under KRS 427.150 from KRS 427.170.

Because he has not sought protection under the Bankruptcy Code, the appellee is limited to those exemptions under KRS 427.150, which do not exempt disability payments.

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